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Abstract
In the context of the marginalising effects of agro-food chain dynamics on upstream suppliers, this
paper examines the extent to which geographical indications may improve the positioning of
small-scale producers. Making an original distinction between established and nascent
geographical indication systems, the paper undertakes a case study of the latter type (the
Mako´ Onion Protected Designation of Origin, Hungary), hitherto overlooked in the literature.
The study adopts a global value chain perspective to analyse three means by which geographical
indications may facilitate upgrading (capturing higher margins, stimulating collective action and
enabling diversification), finding that none have been delivered via the Mako´ Onion Protected
Designation of Origin. The paper examines the reasons for this, identifying the role played by the
political and institutional context. Recommendations are made for improving the upgrading
potential of geographical indications when applied to nascent systems.
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Introduction
While globally, food processing and retail sectors have become increasingly concentrated
(Dobson et al., 2003), most branches of agriculture remain characterised by large numbers of
family-owned farms, with the effect that power in agro-food supply chains is increasingly
skewed towards downstream buyers (Hingley, 2005; Hingley et al., 2006). Small-scale
producers, unable to reap economies of scale, face high transaction costs and insufficient
ability to deliver the production volume and control systems demanded by multiple retailers.
As a result, many are vulnerable to exclusion from mainstream food supply chains (Hanf,
2014; Van Der Meer, 2006), while those that do remain ‘risk becoming simple pieceworkers
on their land’ while dominant downstream actors ‘control the means of production and the
output, and capture most of the value circulating in the system’ (Trebbin and Hassler, 2012).
Over the last few decades, policymakers and scholars alike have asked how small-scale
producers can compete effectively in supply chains dominated by increasingly
concentrated and more powerful downstream actors.
One mechanism with the potential to improve the fortunes of small-scale producers is
geographical indication (GI) legislation. GIs constitute a form of intellectual property rights
protection and are defined in the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPS) Agreement as ‘indications which identify a good as originating in a territory. . .
where a given quality, reputation or other characteristic of the good is essentially
attributable to its geographic origin’ (WTO, 1994). The application for a GI typically
involves a group of interested parties (e.g. producers) submitting a collectively agreed
Code of Practice to the relevant authority, which specifies the production process for the
good, its distinctive qualities and the geographic boundaries of the production area. Once a
GI has been registered, only those goods which have been made in the production area
according to the Code of Practice may bear the GI name. In this way, producers of registered
goods are protected from misuse of the name, and therefore the loss of their intellectual
property, by non-registered parties (Galtier et al., 2013).
Advocates claim that GIs aid small-scale producers by protecting and rewarding
enhanced quality and empowering producer action. For example, Coombe and Aylwin
(2011) argue that GIs ‘enable producers to circumvent mass commodity markets’ by
exploiting growing niche markets (p. 2029) and can further ‘local farmers’ dignity and
autonomy’ (p. 2038) while Rangnekar (2011) writes that GIs offer ‘a remarkable
opportunity to resist the erasure of place and participate in social movements of place’ (p.
2057). In EU agro-food policy, GIs are regarded as fundamental to supporting ‘a quality
orientation’ (European Parliament and the Council of the European Union, 2012) with the
two most important certifications being the Protected Designation of Origin (PDO) and
Protected Geographical Indication (PGI).
In the now abundant literature on GIs, studies have been conducted from macro-policy
(e.g. Barham, 2003; Coombe and Aylwin, 2011) and developmental perspectives (Kizos and
Vakoufaris, 2011a; Profeta et al., 2010; Rangnekar, 2011), and amongst the many cases
analysed, insights have been revealed into the processes of negotiation around Codes of
Practice (e.g. Bowen, 2010; Mancini, 2013; Tregear et al., 2007), power relations between
actors (Kizos and Vakoufaris, 2011b; Mancini, 2013; Rangnekar, 2011) and the
consequences of varying actors’ strategies (Bowen, 2010; Bowen and De Master, 2011;
Dentoni et al., 2012). However, although the literature to date provides some important
clues about the limitations of GIs as tools for economic development and some of the
unintended consequences of implementation, we argue it has two key limitations. First,
the vast majority of existing studies conceptualise GI systems1 as reasonably homogenous,
emerging from wider agro-food chains, and relating to them, in a broadly similar way.
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To advance understanding, we argue for a need to recognise heterogeneity across GI
systems, and we address this here by distinguishing two specific types: (i) established,
mature systems, in which producer relations are well developed and the protected
products possess substantial market reputations yielding significant price premiums, and
(ii) nascent, developing systems, in which producers’ connections to each other are more
recently established or fragile, and the protected product’s reputation is weaker or more
localised, giving consequently less assured premiums. To date, GI research has been based
overwhelmingly on cases of the former type, often in countries with political and
institutional orientations favourably disposed to GIs, for instance Parma Ham and
Parmigiano-Reggiano cheese in Italy (Dentoni et al., 2012), and Roquefort and Comte´
cheeses in France (Bessie`re, 1998; Bowen and De Master, 2011; Torre, 2006). Whilst such
work often confirms that GIs deliver significantly higher margins to producers compared
with non-designated alternatives, we argue similar results cannot be assumed for nascent
systems – particularly those located in countries with unfavourable political and institutional
infrastructure for GIs – because in these systems, GIs act as a potential contributor to
reputation building, rather than protector of an existing, high value asset. To address this
gap, our research into the upgrading potential of GIs is focused on a nascent GI system in a
country context non-typical of prevailing work. The second limitation in the GI literature is
that much case study analysis is conducted without reference to a strong theoretical
underpinning or analytical framework, in which the observed dynamics of GI systems are
systematically examined and robustly explained. We address this in the present study by
applying the global value chain (GVC) framework (Gereffi, 2014; Gereffi et al., 2005; Ponte
and Gibbon, 2005), supported by theory drawn from the agro-food studies literature. The
GVC approach is recognised widely as appropriate to the analysis of agro-food supply chain
dynamics, strategies for upgrading and explanation of outcomes for farmers, and has been
highlighted as valuable specifically for the study of GIs (Bowen, 2010), although to date its
application has not been fully realised.
Empirically, the paper analyses the case of the Hungarian Mako´ onion (Mako´i
vo¨ro¨shagyma or Mako´i hagyma), examining specifically the extent to which the GI has
improved the fortunes of small-scale producers.2 Although farmers in the area of Mako´,
a small town on Hungary’s Southern Great Plain (De´l - Alfo¨ld), have a long history of
onion production, their GI-related collaboration is a recent phenomenon, and although
the product does have renown, it is modest in nature and confined to the domestic
market. Moreover, GIs generally remain largely peripheral to Hungary’s agro-food
policy. After the downfall of state socialism the country was initially preoccupied with
liberalising prices and supply chains, attracting foreign direct investment and
redistributing land. More recently, Hungarian agricultural policy has focused on
implementation of the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy and boosting returns to
farmers through direct payments. Its rural development plan for 2007–2013 made no
mention of GIs or specific European designations such as PDO and PGI (MARD,
2011). Hence the case is a good example of a nascent GI system located in a non-
typical country for GI research.
The next section of this paper introduces the GVC analytical framework and body of
theory which together inform this study, before considering the implications for whether, in
principle, GIs may improve the fortunes of small-scale producers. This is followed by a
discussion of the methodology and sources of evidence. The findings of the analysis are
then reported and the subsequent discussion reflects on how the results compare with the
theoretical propositions presented earlier. The paper concludes with development
recommendations for the Mako´ onion PDO and nascent GI systems like it, as well as
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critical reflections on the conceptualisation of GIs in the GVC and agro-food studies
literatures.
GVCs and quality conventions in the agro-food sector
The GVC perspective conceptualises contemporary economies as dense and spatially
dynamic networks of firms, in which different configurations of inter- and intra-firm
relationships can emerge along supply chains (Gereffi, 2014) according to salient features
of the chain and the governance imperatives of lead firms (Ponte and Sturgeon, 2014).
Through these features and imperatives, GVC analysis can explain how firms, such as
small-scale suppliers in the global agro-food sector become excluded or marginalised from
value chains, as they become ‘captured’, or transactionally dependent on larger, more
powerful buyers (Gereffi et al., 2005). Within the GVC perspective, quality marks and
certifications are generally conceptualised as tools by which near-market lead firms in
buyer-driven chains may control and align the activities of other upstream firms, to their
own advantage (Ponte and Gibbon, 2005).
Although acknowledging its usefulness, critics argue that the GVC perspective has too
narrow a focus on commercial transactions between actors in a vertical chain (Coe et al.,
2008). Consequently, the GVC approach risks downplaying the role of states in giving
momentum to upgrading trajectories, e.g. via investments in R&D, training and
infrastructure (Neilson et al., 2014). The approach also operates with a weakly theorised
notion of quality (Morgan et al., 2006), and underemphasises the role of institutional and
collective power, as well as wider social and institutional contexts, in shaping firms’ goals,
behaviours and interrelations, as highlighted in the Global Production Network literature
(Barrientos et al., 2011; Henderson et al., 2002). As these wider dimensions are pertinent to
the present study, we looked to the agro-food studies literature for further theoretical
insights. In this literature, authors draw from conventions theory (CT), which proposes
that actor configurations and relations in a system are shaped by ‘conventions’:
normalised routines and habits (Morgan et al., 2006), which over time are absorbed into
state or regional policies, regulations and institutions (Parrott et al., 2002; Ponte and
Gibbon, 2005). From the now familiar six categories of conventions originally proposed
by Boltanski and The´venot (1991) (market, industrial, domestic, civic, inspirational and
opinion), archetypal ‘worlds of production’ have been conceptualised (Storper and Salais,
1997), these being spaces in which actors may operate and interrelate according to distinct
underlying norms and principles (Murdoch et al., 2000; Murdoch and Miele, 1999). Two
such archetypes, relevant for the current study, are the ‘industrial’ world, characterised by
standardised-generic production, price-driven transactions and quality manifest through
official standards and technical criteria, and the ‘interpersonal’ world, characterised by
dedicated-specialised production, reciprocal and trust-based exchanges, and quality
manifest through local, personal and experiential judgements (Murdoch and Miele, 1999).
Interestingly, whilst quality marks and standards are generally considered, by both CT and
GVC scholars, as artefacts of the industrial world (Ponte and Gibbon, 2005), GIs,
specifically, are associated with the domestic conventions of the interpersonal world, as
expressions of localised, inherited skills and community-based endeavour (e.g. Morgan
et al., 2006; Ponte and Sturgeon, 2014). In the context of established GI systems in
countries with long histories of institutional support, such a conceptualisation may have
merit. However, for nascent GI systems, particularly in non-typical countries, the
implications are less clear. What is the potential for GIs to improve the fortunes of small-
scale producers in value chains, when state and regional institutions are not conducive to an
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interpersonal archetype, and where the inter-relationships between firms in the chain – not
least between producers themselves – are only recently established and uncertain? Before
investigating this empirically, the next section presents in more detail the arguments and
evidence from existing studies in the GI literature.
The upgrading potential of GIs for small-scale agro-food producers
To explore the potential of GIs to enhance the fortunes of small-scale producers, we return
to the GVC literature, which articulates specific upgrading strategies that disadvantaged
firms may pursue in order to leverage improved value chain positions (Gereffi and
Fernandez-Stark, 2011; Ponte and Ewert, 2009). Three of these strategies are particularly
relevant to GIs, and we introduce and examine each in turn: (i) capturing higher margins for
existing products, (ii) engaging in collective action and (iii) diversifying into new products.3
Capturing higher margins for existing products
The first way that small-scale producers may upgrade is by capturing higher margins for
existing products, for example by moving up the quality grade ladder (Gibbon, 2001) or
protecting an existing reputation for quality. The economic theory often invoked to explain
how quality standards such as GIs work within markets tends to adopt an industrial world
perspective of firm behaviour and inter-relationships, i.e. transactions are price driven and
remote, and the impulse of actors is to exploit others unless regulations and economic
incentives prevent this. Quality marks, including GIs, are conceptualised as one means of
prevention: by embodying quality information transmissible across distances, GIs reduce the
information asymmetry between remotely situated producers and buyers in a value chain
(Akerlof, 1970), therefore making it possible for small-scale producers to convey the higher
quality attributes of their goods and hence capture a premium (Moschini et al., 2008). Via
the same mechanism, GIs also prevent leakage of premiums by preventing fraudulent use of
GI labels by firms not part of the registered system (Profeta et al., 2010). Evidence relating to
established GI systems does support the existence of this mechanism: e.g. Torre’s (2006)
observations of the long-term price maintenance of Appe´lations d’Origine Controˆle´e wines in
France, De Roest and Menghi’s (2000) analysis of milk prices destined for PDO Parmigiano
Reggiano cheese and studies of Jersey Royal Potatoes and Mela Val di Non apples, which
show superior returns to farmers compared with non-designated equivalent products
(London Economics, 2008; Wilson et al., 2000).
However, established GI systems do not always deliver better returns for small-scale
producers, even when buyers pay a premium. In some cases, premiums are captured and
retained by the largest (often downstream/processing) firms in a system (e.g. Bowen, 2010;
Galtier et al., 2013), in a dynamic reminiscent of ‘lead firm’ manoeuvrings and industrial
world conventions. Other cases of established GI systems reveal that the regulatory GI
process itself can fail to redress these imbalances, for example the tendency for GI
awarding authorities to adopt a ‘lowest common denominator’ threshold of inclusion, so
that larger, more industrial firms are admitted to the producer group (Rangnekar, 2011). In
these cases, smaller scale producers delivering the highest quality related to traditional skills
and know-how receive no reward for their efforts (Mancini, 2013), which leads some in
established systems to replace their use of the GI with a private brand to communicate
quality more effectively to more knowledgeable, discerning consumers (Dentoni et al.,
2012; Kizos and Vakoufaris, 2011b; Mancini, 2013; Tregear et al., 2007). It is tempting to
interpret such efforts as small-scale producers seeking to shift from industrial to
Tregear et al. 437
interpersonal world conventions, with GIs acting, perhaps unexpectedly, as a push rather
than a pull factor.
If the above presents a rather mixed picture of the potential for GIs to promote higher
margins in established systems, what are the implications for nascent systems, particularly in
non-typical countries? We argue they are also uncertain. First, although GIs in established
systems may reduce leakage of premiums and (sometimes) reward higher quality production,
these benefits depend upon products having an existing strong reputation, which buyers
recognise and other actors may seek to usurp. It is far less clear how such advantages
would apply to nascent systems, where existing renown is modest or very localised, and
quality reputations are underdeveloped. The potential for benefits seems even less likely in
non-typical countries, where the GI concept and label may be poorly understood in the
public domain, hence unlikely to contribute to establishing a reputation. Second, although in
nascent systems small-scale producers may have greater flexibility to build groups that work
to their own advantage (as established interests and interventions of other value chain actors
should often be lighter), the leadership and managerial skills needed to bring such a group to
fruition are considerable, and may be particularly difficult to develop in non-typical
countries where institutional resourcing, training and mentoring are limited. Overall, it is
uncertain whether GIs do provide premium and margin capturing opportunities for small-
scale producers, particularly those in nascent systems in non-typical countries.
Collective action
The second way in which GIs may facilitate upgrading is by stimulating collective action
between producers in a system. GIs differ from many other forms of quality mark and
intellectual property protection by applying to producer groups, not single firms. Through
collective action, producers may reap economic advantages such as efficiencies via pooling
resources and lowering of transaction costs between producers. Moreover, through Codes of
Practice and geographic boundary specifications, GIs may also allow small-scale producers
to collectively prevent downstream lead firms from introducing new suppliers to the value
chain, such as lower cost, non-member competitors. In other words, GIs may offer
countervailing power (Galbraith, 1954; Henderson et al., 2002) to improve small
producers’ bargaining position in the value chain. From an agro-food studies perspective,
GIs collective action may also be interpreted as small-scale producers’ effort not only to
harness a mechanism for improving their position in an industrial world, but also perhaps to
create or engage with interpersonal world conventions, where within-group or within-chain
interrelations are reciprocal, trustful and intimate, and built upon a platform of shared
values.
Evidence from the literature on established systems indicates that GIs can indeed inspire
interpersonal world collective action, from which the economic benefits of greater bargaining
power and within-group efficiencies accrue (e.g. the cases of Parmigiano Reggiano or Comte´
cheeses). In other cases, the collective action inspired by GIs seems to be more characteristic
of industrial world conventions, where power imbalances in consortia emerge, and large –
particularly downstream – lead firms dominate decision-making (Bowen, 2010; Mancini,
2013). For example, Bowen (2010) documents how the strategic interests of powerful
distilleries and multinational liquor companies dominate the GI system for tequila. As the
GI region for tequila is large (11.2 million hectares) and includes a vast number of agave
farmers, distilleries easily switch between the latter for their own advantage. In such cases,
consortium membership fails to provide small-scale producers with countervailing power. In
nascent GI systems characterised by fewer industrial-scale producers, smaller producers may
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be in a stronger position to build and shape interpersonal world consortia with internal
governance mechanisms working to their advantage. However, such producer groups may
not attain sufficient scale to be anything more than marginal players in value chains, unable
to leverage any countervailing power. In non-typical countries where promotion and
development of GIs remains weak, small-scale producers may struggle even more to
realise the upgrading advantages of collective action.
Diversification into new products and markets
The third way in which GIs may facilitate small-scale producer upgrading is by stimulating
diversification into new, higher margin products or markets (Gibbon, 2001), for example
entering downstream activities like processing or retailing, or broadening into auxiliary
activities such as farm tourism generated from visitors drawn to an area by a product’s
reputation. Studies of cases in France and Italy identify how PDO/PGI products from
established systems can facilitate the growth of auxiliary activities (Ray, 1998) or wider
‘basket of goods’ rural development, whereby an emblematic agro-food product
contributes to development directly via production activities (generating jobs and income),
and also through being a focal point for linked initiatives, such as festivals, agro-tourism and
gastronomic routes (Tregear et al., 2007). The context for such activities brings to mind once
again interpersonal world conventions, in which rural communities characterised by dense,
lateral ties and strong cross-sectoral relationships are platforms for diverse activities linked
to goods with local, specialised quality. However, this community-led vision of
diversification is by no means a feature of all established GI systems: Bessie`re (1998), for
example, critiques Roquefort production for its weak development links to the regional
community, which are akin to those of an industrial world chain. It may be argued that
diversification opportunities may be even more difficult to pursue for nascent systems, where
product renown is weaker and the position and status of the GI system in the wider
community is less secure. Producers in nascent systems may be at a further disadvantage
by lacking the skills or capital required to successfully enter diversified markets, a situation
exacerbated in non-typical countries where dedicated infrastructure and training is lacking.
For example, in the UK many attempts by dairy farmers, both individually and collectively,
to engage in downstream activities (e.g. manufacturing cheese) have failed due to a lack of
marketing and entrepreneurial skills (McElwee et al., 2006).
Methodology
Given the predominance of studies focusing on established GI systems, the Mako´ onion
PDO, as an example of a developing/nascent GI system, represents a critical case which has
‘strategic importance in relation to the general problem’ (Flyvbjerg, 2006). Following
established practices in case study-based research (Yin, 2009), the analysis utilised
multiple sources of evidence. This included scrutiny of relevant documentation (e.g. the
PDO Code of Practice), undertaking 12 in-depth interviews, and conducting a shop check,
which examined the availability and price of Mako´ onions against competitors in Hungarian
retail outlets.
Interviewees included the president of the Consortium of Hungarian Onion Producers,
Processors and Traders (the controlling body of the Mako´ PDO), five onion farmers who
were members of the consortium, two onion farmers who were non-members, an industry
expert, a wholesaler/trader and a representative of the state tourism agency (Tourinform)
based in Mako´. Interviews with consortium members discussed their farm and onion
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production, consortium involvement and operation, impact of consortium membership on
production and marketing, as well as future plans. Interviews with non-member farmers
focused on reasons for not joining the consortium. Interviews with other actors explored the
perceived impact of the PDO, barriers to its development and the reasons for these, in their
particular sphere of expertise. Interviews took place between June and September 2013. By
the 11th and 12th interviews minimal new insights emerged, implying data and theoretical
saturation had been reached. The shop check, conducted in November 2013, noted the
availability and price of onions from Mako´ as well as competitors in 10 retail outlets (six
supermarkets, two greengrocers and two markets) in Budapest.
All interviews were conducted in Hungarian and recorded for transcription and content
analysis using NVivo10 software. Theoretical thematic analysis of data stemmed from the
main objective of the paper – to examine the extent to which GIs may facilitate upgrading
amongst small-scale producers in a nascent GI system. This followed the procedures for
analysis outlined by Braun and Clarke (2006). The next sections describe the evolution of the
Hungarian agro-food sector in recent decades, focusing on the social, political and
institutional features which help explain contemporary dynamics and actor behaviour in
the Mako´ GI system and onion chain, followed by an account of how the current system
operates and evidence of upgrading strategies.
Findings
The Hungarian agro-food sector and Mako´ PDO system
During the socialist era, Hungary possessed a bimodal agricultural system consisting of a
‘socialised’ element (state and co-operative farms), which coexisted alongside household,
small-scale production. The state largely directed relationships within socialised agro-food
chains with an emphasis on augmenting quantity rather than preserving quality. However,
despite mass mechanisation and an extensive network of agricultural research institutions
and universities, the productivity of workers on state and co-operative farms remained poor
by international standards with employees cynical of Party rhetoric and public socialist
institutions (Lampland, 1995). During this era, there was no legal protection of GIs, in
fact legislation was not passed until 1997 and the latter largely reflected external factors,
specifically conformity with the WTO’s TRIPS agreement and EU legislation, associated
with membership of both bodies, rather than internal pressures.
The first post-communist government embarked on a process of decollectivisation and
land restitution, shrinking dramatically the land area given over to co-operatives and
successor companies of former state farms. After stagnation in the 1980s, state socialist
agriculture was regarded as a failure, with ‘individual farming’ championed. However, the
farms created were small by international standards: over 90% operated less than 10 ha
(Swain, 1999). Most were ill-equipped, financially and technically, to meet the needs of
rapidly expanding, largely foreign-owned multiple retailers (Dries et al., 2004). Yet while
acknowledging their weak position within modern supply chains, small-scale farmers remain
deeply suspicious of any form of co-operation, associating it with a return to ‘socialist
agriculture’. Guarding their independence, such farmers are often ‘conservative and
unable to recognise the need for quality and changes in production methods’ (Csa´ki and
Forgacs, 2007).
The predicament of the Mako´ onion PDO reflects this particular socio-economic legacy.
The cultivation of onions in Hungary dates back to the 15th century, with the town
becoming the leading centre of onion production within the Habsburg Monarchy. Mako´’s
pre-eminence reflected its long, hot and dry summers that slows the development of new
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leaves during the formation of onion bulbs, and its rich soils. During the socialist era, a
breeding station developed new varieties with high dry-matter content suited to industrial
processing, and a drying plant processed 80–90 tonnes of raw onions per day (To´th, 1998).
After regime change, the breeding station and drying plant closed, with the Mako´ developed
varieties long surpassed, in terms of yield and resistance, by new hybrids, bred outside of
Hungary. Regarding farm structure, Mako´ now resembles much of Hungary: a small
number of large farms, whose origins are the state and co-operatives farms of the socialist
era, and a mass of small-scale farms that individually lack of the volume, control systems
and technology to meet the needs of international retailers. The ability of Hungarian
agriculture to meet retailers’ requirements is hindered by its ageing population, with
Hungary’s rural areas suffering from ongoing depopulation and consequent loss of
services and real purchasing power (Nemes, 2005).
Capturing higher margins from Mako´ PDO
The Consortium of Hungarian Onion Producers, Processors and Traders, based in Mako´,
has 64 members. It includes two relatively large growers: Kossuth Cooperative (60 ha of
certified PDO Mako´ onions) and Termix Mako´ Ltd (10 ha of PDO Mako´ onions). The
remaining production area of certified PDO onions (approximately 130 ha) is accounted
for by small-scale producers. Three quarters of PDO designated onions are sold through
supermarkets via Zo¨ldse´g Centrum Ltd, a trader and wholesaler, based in Mako´, which is
also a member of the consortium. Approximately 10–15% of certified output goes to fruit
and vegetable wholesale markets in Szeged and Budapest, with the remainder sold directly to
consumers via small-scale, often informal, channels. Not all farmers who are consortium
members now grow PDO-designated onions with several reporting that they switched to
non-certified varieties for economic reasons.
The Mako´ PDO was registered officially in 2009. Under the PDO only three onion
varieties are permitted: Mako´i CR (climate resistant), Csana´d and Mako´i Bronz cultivars,
all of which were developed during the 1970s and early 1980s at the town’s breeding station.
The average yield of PDO certified varieties is 25–30 tonnes/ha. This compares with yields
for more modern varieties in Hungary of 40–60 and 80–100 tonnes/ha on the most efficient
Dutch and German farms. Production costs per kg of Mako´ PDO onions averaged, in 2013,
E0.16–E0.21 per kg, compared to E0.06–E0.11 per kg for higher yielding, non-designated
varieties. Farmers reported no changes in their production practices (e.g. input use and
intensity) as a result of PDO registration and the implementation of the Code of Practice.
Annual onion consumption in Hungary averages 85,000 tonnes, of which 5000 tonnes is
accounted for by Mako´ PDO onions. The latter’s share of the market has dwindled in recent
years as imports have grown substantially (Table 1) with Hungary becoming a net importer
of onions. The decline in domestic production has been dramatic: by 2012 the area devoted
to onions and production volumes were only one-third of those recorded a decade
previously. By 2012, Mako´ PDO onions accounted for approximately 10% of Hungary’s
total onion production. No PDO certified onions are exported.
In supermarkets, Mako´ PDO onions sell in 0.75 kg string containers under the Zo¨ldse´g
Centrum brand at a price similar to 1 kg of loose onions (i.e. roughly 33% relative mark-up).
The shop check revealed that Mako´ PDO onions were available only in two of the 10 retail
outlets (both larger stores of multiple retailers) and the shelf-space devoted to the product
was modest. PDO onion growers reported receiving E0.10–E0.20 per kg for their output,
which in most cases was below production costs.4 Farmers reported no difference in the price
they received for designated and non-designated onions, with a similar picture at wholesale
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level. On this basis, only at the retail level of the supply chain is there a difference between
the price of PDO designated and non-designated onions.
No producer uses the PDO label as they sell in bulk. Zo¨ldse´g Centrum does apply the
PDO logo on designated onions destined for supermarkets, alongside its own branding.
However, to fulfil its contracts with supermarkets, Zo¨ldse´g Centrum also imports onions
from Holland and Germany, which are packaged in a similar manner, with Zo¨ldse´g Centrum
branding, albeit without the PDO logo. PDO-certified onions are thus not marketed in a
particularly distinctive manner and some imported onions may be confused with those
grown in Mako´. While Mako´ is famous for its onions in Hungary, consumers
overwhelmingly are unfamiliar with the EU agro-food quality schemes and the
consortium president reported widespread suspicion, so ‘if we put the PDO label on the
package, it repels people. They think for sure they cheat and it comes not from Mako´’.
Interviewed producers were overwhelmingly pessimistic about achieving a higher margin
for Mako´ PDO onions, with the perception that few consumers are willing to pay a higher
price for the designated varieties on the one hand, with lower yields, worsening genetics and
lower resistance compared with more modern varieties presenting production challenges on
the other hand. Rather than the PDO being an asset for facilitating upgrading via achieving
greater added value for their production, producers regarded it is an impediment tied to
outdated varieties.
Collective action from Mako´ PDO
A presidency, elected by members, manages the consortium. It has nine members: a
president, two vice-presidents and six ordinary members. The president of the consortium
since April 2011 has been the owner–manager of Zo¨ldse´g Centrum, which also owns Termix
Mako´. The consortium was established in February 2003, as a producers’ organisation
rather than as a vehicle for obtaining a PDO. The PDO application was submitted in
October 2005. Consortium membership fees are relatively modest, approximately E13 per
annum for small-scale producers and E267 for companies/larger producers. Internal
resources are thus very limited; although Zo¨ldse´g Centrum spent an additional E33,000
on a marketing campaign to promote PDO Mako´ onions within supermarkets. The
process of applying for and registering the PDO was initiated by the Ministry of
Agriculture with involvement of the consortium. This developed in a rather ‘top down’
manner so that, as one interviewee noted, ‘everything was decided by the Ministry of
Agriculture and locals were not really involved in the process’.
The consortium monitors usage of the PDO logo and ‘Mako´i hagyma’ label. Interviewees
reported minimal abuse of the label, apart from possibly some small-scale market sellers.
The Code of Practice is enforced with inspections (e.g. soil and plant) several times a year
and farmers reported that quality control systems were robust and enforced effectively. The
Code of Practice restricts PDO production to 16 districts of Csongra´d County and two in
neighbouring Be´ke´s County. These geographical boundaries have not proved controversial
or a source of conflict. While members largely regarded the consortium’s decision-making
structure as transparent and democratic, it nonetheless was perceived as ineffective as it has
failed to improve the fortunes of growers. As one producer noted ‘for the consortium there is
nothing important to deal with, as they have no influence on the onion market’.
Consequently, some members take little interest in its activities.
PDO registration has not stimulated co-operative activity between farmers (e.g. new
forms of collective marketing) and has not increased their bargaining power in the value
chain. While actors within the consortium do vary in terms of their power, there is little
Tregear et al. 443
competition between them because, as the consortium president recounted, ‘there is nothing
to fear [from each other] as production is unprofitable’. All remain relatively weak in the face
of international retailers and lack of consumer engagement with the product.
Diversification into new products and markets from Mako´ PDO
Several non-agricultural services reflect Mako´’s renown for onions. The town possesses
onion-themed attractions including a Hagymatikum (onion-themed spa), Hagyma Ha´z
(cultural centre), onion-shaped statue and fountain, and hosts an annual two-day onion
festival. The Hagymatikum was designed by the revered Hungarian architect Imre
Makovecz and opened in 2009. An analysis of the spa’s visitors in 2012 revealed that
three quarters were Hungarian, with the majority from Mako´ itself or the surrounding
county. The remaining visitors came from Romania, especially those living close to the
Hungarian border. There are also some attractions, such as an adventure park and
playground, which have minimal association with onions.
Since the PDO designation was granted in 2009, the number of bed and breakfast houses
(6), hotels (1), cafes (4) and restaurants (6) in Mako´ has remained almost unchanged. There
is little involvement of onion farmers in tourism and hospitality or cross-sectional co-
operation. For instance one consortium member, noted that while the Hagymatikum was
a ‘nice initiative’, farmers do not gain directly so that ‘other sectors take advantage of the
reputation of the onion while producers, so far, do not benefit from other sectors’. There is
no ongoing forum for bringing farmers together with other actors and the PDO designation
in itself has not stimulated upgrading via diversification.
The Tourinform informant felt that there were few prospects for onion-based tourism as
while the ‘onion is still associated with Mako´ in the Hungarian mind, alone it is not enough
to attract tourists’. However, tourists attracted for other reasons may buy onions while
visiting. A LEADER project, established in 2008, sought to develop gastronomic tourist
routes in Mako´ and the wider region, linked to onions and garlic, culinary herbs, the
perceived medicinal properties of various fruits and vegetables, ancient livestock breeds,
honey and other aspects of cultural heritage. A webpage, CD and brochure were
produced from the project, but the webpage is no longer available and the other materials
are now all out of stock.
The onion festival attracted 10,000–12,000 visitors per day in 2013. When first established in
1991, the festival was principally a meeting for professional growers. However, over time it has
evolved into a wider programme, incorporating sporting and equestrian events, flea market,
concerts and a firework display. Some onion-related activities remain such as a culinary
competition and exhibition for onion producers with the best winning the ‘golden onion’
prize. The festival draws on local authority and EU rural development funds (circa E160,000
for 2013–14), is free for visitors and exhibiting farmers are charged only a nominal fee.
The PDO has not stimulated the engagement of local actors in downstream processing. In
fact, recent decades have witnessed a disengagement from the latter, with the closure of the
drying plant. The PDO certified varieties, especially Csana´d, were developed for this purpose
and have high dry matter content. There are no plans to reopen the plant given the perceived
lack of market for dried onions.
Discussion
Drawing from a GVC perspective, agro-food studies and the GI literature, this paper began
by arguing that although in some circumstances GIs may act as mechanisms for small-scale
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producer upgrading – either through improving positioning in value chains characterised by
industrial conventions (Ponte and Gibbon, 2005) or engaging with more interpersonal ones
(Murdoch and Miele, 1999) – these outcomes appear questionable in other cases, particularly
nascent GI systems in non-typical countries. As the Mako´ PDO case reveals, in practice,
negligible upgrading from the GI, in this section we pull together our explanations for this,
drawing from factors relating to the nascent character of the system itself, as well as the
political and institutional context of this non-typical country.
The first upgrading strategy for small-scale producers involves capturing higher margins
for existing products. In established systems located in countries with a GI tradition, GIs
support margin capture by acting as quality marks conveying information that consumers
care about, in a label that they trust, which stimulates their willingness to pay a premium and
also prevents leakage of premiums to fraudulent actors (Moschini et al., 2008; Thiedig and
Sylvander, 2000). In the nascent Mako´ system however, rather than a protection imperative,
producers seek to build consumer recognition of the product name, and its historic
association with quality, from a currently modest base. In this situation, the key
contribution a GI can make to margin capture is as a proxy signal of quality which may
interest or engage consumers unfamiliar with, or indifferent to, the product name. For this
proxy to work however, consumer recognition and positive interpretation of GI labels are
needed. In Hungary, the GI concept is not only relatively unfamiliar to the public, but
generations of consumers have lived through a political regime that leaves a widespread
and enduring mistrust of state-backed claims, inspiring scepticism and negativity towards the
official GI designation. The GI literature rarely problematises consumer recognition of
official GI labels, perhaps because in established systems GIs are supplementary signals to
renowned product names. Our findings suggest that consumer scepticism represents a greater
problem in nascent systems, because of the more important role GIs play in awareness and
association building around the product name.
Another perhaps more obvious reason for the lack of margin capture by the Mako´ PDO
relates to failings in product quality. In both the GI and wider agro-food literatures, small-
scale production is strongly associated with enhanced quality, with traditional varieties and
artisan techniques assumed to translate into a range of superior consumption attributes
(Murdoch et al., 2000). In studies of established GI systems, lead firms in value chains
and ineffective regulators (driven, it is implied, by industrial world conventions) are what
pose a threat to GI product quality, by reducing or removing the rewards to small-scale
producers for their specialised input. However, in the Mako´ PDO case, industrial
conventions have intervened in a slightly different way to create quality problems, via the
historical legacy of state socialism. Driven by an imperative to maximise production to
efficiently feed the domestic population and export to other ideologically aligned states,
and by harnessing technologies in agronomy and food preservation, actors in the onion
chain developed a production and processing system in the Mako´ region centred on three
varieties to supply the state-controlled dried onion market. Decades later, with the dried
onion market collapsed and international competitors utilising improved cultivars, the
legacy of these policies is onion varieties which may be unique to Mako´, but which are
now unfit for purpose. A further legacy of the socialist era is a suspicion of attempts to
collectively produce and market goods and a lack of customer orientation amongst
producers which, combined with weak institutional support for GI applicants, has left the
producers ill-equipped to design Codes of Practice centred on product quality. The decision
to specify exclusively the three outdated varieties in the designation is one which now renders
the GI an obstacle to margin capture, as producers cannot switch to higher yielding or better
eating quality varieties. Overall therefore, through a combination of system nascence and
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socio-political context, the PDO label for Mako´ has failed to improve margins for small-
scale producers.
The second upgrading strategy relates to the potential for GIs to stimulate collective
action amongst small-scale producers, resulting in either an improved bargaining position
in value chains characterised by industrial conventions or creation of an alternative chain
characterised by interpersonal conventions (Murdoch and Miele, 1999). In established GI
systems, the main barriers to GIs fostering collaboration derive from power imbalances in
consortia (Bowen, 2010), with a tendency for more powerful actors to design the Codes of
Practice and dominate the negotiations, so that benefits are captured and retained by an elite
few, with a lack of democratic decision-making. Hence, studies conclude successful collective
action for GIs depends on good internal governance: strong leadership, collective vision and
an organisational process perceived to be fair (Bowen, 2010). We proposed that the
establishment of such governance may be more likely in nascent systems, where small-
scale producers have greater control over how consortia are built. In practice, the Mako´
case suggests something different, which we attribute to its non-typical country context.
Although as expected, there is less evidence of elite capture of benefits in Mako´ compared
with established systems, the legacy of state socialism has left this generation of producers
with little experience or skill in joint mobilisation of activity to improve their value chain
position, and little by way of local social fabric on which the trustful, reciprocal relations of
an interpersonal world chain can be built. Farmers remain deeply sceptical of collective
action in both production and marketing. In many ways, the Mako´ PDO represents the
opposite of an empowering experience for these producers, being a largely externally driven,
top-down process from which they felt excluded, resulting in a consortium that has created
neither a shift in their marginal status in the value chain nor an evolution in their
interrelations. The lack of dedicated institutional support, training and role models, such
as would be more available to nascent groups in ‘typical’ GI countries, compounds the
likelihood of weak collective action. Overall, we conclude that country context, in
particular, explains why the Mako´ PDO has not stimulated this upgrading strategy, and
hence we argue that rectifying strategies for nascent systems should focus on factors external
to the GI system as well as aspects of internal governance normally emphasised in the GIs
literature.
The third upgrading strategy relates to diversification, either into downstream activities to
capture additional gains from the value chain, or auxiliary activities, e.g. farm tourism and
gastronomic routes. For Mako´, the configuration of the domestic onion value chain limits
the options for downstream engagement, particularly given Mako´’s nascent status: multiple
retailers dominate and offer little prospect of capturing higher margins, whilst short supply
chain alternatives (e.g. farmers’ markets, consumer buying groups) may provide some
opportunities, but their share of the market is under-developed and decreasing relative to
multiple retailers (Euromonitor, 2014). The prospects for engagement in processing are also
unpromising, given limited market opportunities, and the fact that new processing activities
of any sort would require investment or support in equipment, plant and training which
would likely be beyond this nascent group. Auxiliary activities have emerged in the Mako´
case (e.g. the Hagymatikum and festival), but to date the involvement of, and direct benefits
to producers are minimal. The non-typical country context plays a role here, specifically the
absence of infrastructure and enduring institutional support for cross-sectional development,
and a lack of experience or ability of most farmers to provide non-agricultural goods and
services. Notwithstanding the precedents of the Hagymatikum and festival, it is also
debatable whether as a nascent group, the Mako´ consortium would have sufficient
financial and cultural capital to spearhead, or even contribute substantially to, a ‘basket
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of goods’ rural development strategy. The Mako´ case highlights starkly the restricted
potential of GIs to promote diversification-based upgrading in comparison to established
GI systems in ‘typical’ countries.
Conclusion
In contemporary agro-food value chains, small-scale suppliers struggle to gain an
advantageous positioning relative to more powerful downstream firms, on whom they are
transactionally dependent. This paper has examined the potential of GIs to improve their
situation, either through better positioning in current value chains, or via new forms of
relationship in alternative chains. GI legislation first emerged as a defensive mechanism to
protect the renown of established GI systems from inferior copycats, and existing research
confirms how this mechanism can work effectively for such systems, particularly in countries
with a history of support for GIs. However, more recent policymaking envisions GI systems
also as enabling institutions that can improve the fortunes of small-scale producers and
contribute to rural development (European Parliament and the Council of the European
Union, 2012). Member States are encouraged to support the formation of consortia and the
official registration of additional, nascent GIs systems. As demonstrated in this paper
however, there are fundamental differences between reputation protection and reputation
building, and the outcomes achieved for established GI systems do not transfer inevitably to
nascent systems, particularly where the latter are located in countries with little historical or
institutional support for GIs. While distinguishing between nascent and established GI
systems is fundamental to understanding the varying outcomes of upgrading strategies for
small-scale producers, it is absent from much of the GIs literature, which tends to discuss the
universal ability of GIs to aid upgrading. This paper argues, and illustrates with the case of
the Mako´ onion PDO, that for GIs to stimulate upgrading in nascent systems, particularly
those located in non-typical countries, certain actions are required. We reflect on two of
these and how they may be supported.
First, there needs to be a greater emphasis placed on market orientation within consortia,
by which we mean the notion of the GI system as an entity that establishes strong
relationships with buyers it understands well, through providing goods of specialised
quality and value. We propose this action is particularly important to facilitate upgrading
through capturing higher margins. By definition, nascent systems lack recognition and
product renown, therefore producers in these systems should be particularly active in
building that recognition, not least through making connections with consumers and
understanding quality from the latter’s perspective. To date, there has been a lack of
institutional and academic attention paid to market orientation in GI systems: state
support for new GIs typically concentrates on their legal establishment and operating
arrangements (e.g. advice on submitting applications, managing internal governance)
rather than how to build strong relationships with other actors in the value chain, whilst
much academic research focuses either on internal aspects of marketing and distribution of
returns within consortia, and/or is hostile to the concept of market orientation, due to
perceived associations with lack of authenticity and industrial conventions. A market
orientation may be vital for nascent systems located in non-typical countries, but also
more complex to develop, where previous eras of state intervention have enduring impacts
on firm and consumer behaviour in value chains, including scepticism towards official GI
designations. Training programmes and events in partnership with educators with
commercial expertise, and field visits, exchanges and mentoring arrangements with
‘successful’ nascent producers are all examples of how market orientation may be fostered.
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The second action for nascent GI systems is the building of effective networks with
regional actors external to the value chain. This is particularly critical for the pursuit of
upgrading via diversification, as this strategy relies on the quality of regional infrastructure,
skills, technologies and social capital. Unlocking external resources is likely to be
particularly important for nascent GI systems which may lack, as in the Mako´ case,
internal capabilities and capital, whilst a regional platform of well-developed
infrastructure facilitates cross-sectoral initiatives. While rural development research shows
how GI products may be the basis for ‘basket of goods’ strategies, many of these studies
focus on emblematic GI products with established renown, and in areas already rich in
infrastructure and social vibrancy. Far fewer studies explore the developmental steps
nascent GI systems can take to foster cross-sectoral links, but these should be integral to
policy assistance to establish or enhance the functioning of nascent GI systems.
Finally, we consider the implications of this study for theory development. For the
literature on GIs, we demonstrate the distinctiveness of established and nascent systems,
and therefore the need for future research to take a more nuanced approach when
conceptualising upgrading or development possibilities for GIs, and the implications for
policy. For the wider agro-food studies literature, our research reveals the complex and
sometimes counterintuitive nature of GIs, which calls into question some aspects of the
way GIs have been theorised so far in this literature. For example, whilst some studies
convey GI designations as manifestations of domestic conventions, and GI systems as
embedded within the interpersonal world, our work supports the conclusion that as
quality marks, GIs can be conceptualised quite compellingly as artefacts of the industrial
world, and that many GI systems, both established and nascent, exhibit aspects of market
and industrial conventions, with the lead firm manoeuvrings and value chain power
imbalances noted by GVC analysts. Rather than aligning GIs unequivocally with specific
conventions or theoretical spaces, future research may usefully conceptualise GIs (both
designations and systems) as hybrid phenomena, with investigations seeking to explain
where and how different configurations of actors, and underpinning conventions, emerge.
For such analysis, GVC perspectives may be useful, but we recommend supporting these
with other perspectives which take account of wider socio-political contexts.
Acknowledgements
The authors are grateful to the handling editor and three anonymous reviewers for their helpful and
constructive comments on an earlier version of this paper. Responsibility for any remaining errors lies
with the authors.
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or
publication of this article.
Funding
The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or
publication of this article:
The research underpinning this paper was conducted as part of COMPETE, a research project
supported by the EU’s Seventh Framework Programme (Contract No. 312029). For further
information about the project: http://www.compete-project.eu/
448 Environment and Planning A 48(2)
Notes
1. In this paper, ‘GI system’ refers to the set of actors directly involved in the production, distribution
and marketing of a GI good, e.g. farmers, packers, processors, wholesalers, retailers. At least some
of these actors may be organised into a formal consortium.
2. Our decision to choose an onion as the case product for this investigation could be questioned on
the basis that a raw good invites less consumer engagement than, for example, a cheese or ham.
However, several successful GI systems exist for unprocessed products, including Jersey Royal
Potatoes and Mela Val di Non apples. Moreover, in Hungary onions are a key ingredient in
almost every traditional and typical dish and, as the case study reveals, many consumers
distinguish between varieties of onions based on their different sensory and culinary properties.
3. An alternative categorisation of upgrading strategies proposed in the GVC literature comprises
‘product’, ‘process’, ‘functional’ and ‘chain’ upgrading. Although widely applied, this
categorisation was less suited to the focus of the current study, due to the difficulties of
distinguishing between ‘product’ and ‘process’ upgrading in an agro-food context, as described
by Ponte and Ewert (2009), and because of the difficulty of capturing collective action as an
explicit upgrading option, a core feature of the GI mechanism which we were seeking to explore.
4. Reasons why the farmers continue to produce the PDO onion, despite it being a loss-making
enterprise, include: sunk costs in specialised machinery for onion production, even greater
uncertainty of markets for alternative crops suited to the soil type (garlic, flower bulbs), lack of
perceived skills to engage in other gainful activities and being too old to learn new methods, and
personal/emotional connections with the crop.
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